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Capital flows to the Brazilian economy: 2003–07
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The Brazilian economy has long been open to foreign capital. As a country with inadequate 
levels of domestic savings (less than 20% of GDP), it has recurrently tapped external 
resources to fund its development. That pattern has not changed much in recent years: as 
Brazilian growth accelerated, from 3.2% in 2005 to 6% in the four quarters up to June 2008, 
its current account position as a percentage of GDP shifted from a surplus of 1.6% to a 
deficit of 1.2%. But in that case, unlike in past episodes, the composition of external liabilities 
shifted as the balance moved to a deficit – debt instruments were largely replaced by equity 
stakes (Graph 1). The change has had two important implications for balance of payments 
dynamics: exchange rate risk now predominantly lies with foreign investors rather than 
Brazilian borrowers; and returns on foreign capital invested in Brazil tend to be more highly 
correlated with domestic economic conditions than with monetary policy in the mature 
economies (Graph 2).  
After the debt crisis, which began in 1982, Brazil did not return to international financial 
markets until the 1990s, after successfully completing a restructuring agreement with its 
creditors. Brazil’s macroeconomic framework then improved considerably, with the end of 
hyperinflation in 1994 and the introduction of a wide-ranging privatisation programme in the 
latter part of the decade. Moreover, Brazil removed legal restrictions on participation by non-
residents in some sectors of the economy (for instance, oil and gas, and 
telecommunications). With that liberalisation plus privatisation, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in Brazil increased, but debt instruments still dominated. Within the set of portfolio 
flows, equity flows dominated briefly, but otherwise, until the past few years, flows mainly 
consisted of fixed income instruments, mostly in the form of public debt. 
As this note will discuss, the recent increase in flows to and from the Brazilian economy and 
the recent trend towards the participation of direct investors have been supported by the 
cycle of abundant international liquidity, but they have also been stimulated by the improving 
fundamentals of the Brazilian economy.  
1.  Recent trends in capital flows to Brazil  
Foreign direct investment 
Flows of non-resident direct investment to Brazil were small and reasonably stable, at around 
USD  1.6  billion per year, when the country was in default (1982–92). This performance 
reflected a high degree of macroeconomic uncertainty plus the presence of legal restrictions 
on FDI in selected sectors. After the 1992 agreement on external debt, which was approved 
by Congress in 1994, and after the introduction of the Real plan, which ended hyperinflation, 
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GDP growth increased, reaching 5.9% in 1994 and 4.2% in 1995. Likewise, inflows began an 
upward trend, and some sort of accelerator effect seemed to be at work: net FDI inflows, 
which were USD  2.1  billion in 1994 and USD  4.4  billion in 1995, shot up to an annual 
average of USD 15.7 billion in the 1995–98 period. Of that new amount, which was roughly 
10 times the average inflow in the debt crisis period, only about 10% was in the form of 
intercompany loans (Table 1).
4 Moreover, inflows were speeding up at the margin, reaching 
USD 28.8 billion in 1998. 
Graph 1 
Capital flows to Brazil  
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4  Net FDI inflows are the gross inflows deducted from the repatriation of FDI previously made, accumulated 



















































































Direct investment flows to and from Brazil 
In millions of US dollars 
  2005 2006 2007 2008
1  1995–98  1999–
2002  2003–07 
Foreign direct 
investment
2  15,066 18,823 34,584 24,576 15,761 25,102 19,352 
Equity capital  15,045  15,373 26,074 17,670 14,107 23,971 16,876 
Intercompany 
loans  21 3,450 8,510 6,906 1,654 1,131 2,476 
Brazilian direct 
investment abroad
2 2,517 28,202  7,067 12,374  1,149  1,049  9,568 
1  Up to August.    
2  Net of returns. 
 
Inflows in those years were strongly influenced by the privatisation and deregulation 
programmes, which allowed foreign participation in new fields like energy, gas, rail 
transportation, telecommunications and financial services. Although FDI in privatised 
enterprises reached USD 42.1 billion
5 and, with the exception of 1999, was never more than 
one third of the annual inflow, the favourable environment it created stimulated FDI in other 
sectors. 
During the financial crises of the 1990s – Mexico in 1994–95, Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998, 
Argentina and the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and Brazil’s pre-election confidence crisis in 2002 – 
FDI annual inflows continued to be robust. They averaged USD 25.1 billion, equivalent to 
about 4.3% of GDP, in 1999–2002, and financed almost all of the current account deficit.
6 
From 2003 on, after a small decline, the upward trend continued, and FDI, with no 
privatisation-related inflows, reached USD 34.6 billion in 2007. 
Until privatisation and deregulation in the 1990s, FDI used to be concentrated in 
manufacturing (66.8% of the stock), while the services sector received 29.3% and agriculture 
and mining just 3.9%.
7 Within the manufacturing sector, the chemical products industry 
received some 15.3% of total FDI, followed by the automotive sector (13%), basic metallurgy 
and food and beverages (8% each) and machinery and equipment (6.3%). However, since 
then, around 50% of gross FDI inflows have been directed to the services sector, specially 
telecommunications (20.2% of FDI in the services sector), financial and auxiliary services 
(20.4%), retail trade (15.5%), gas and energy (11.2%) and real estate (9.3%). This trend 
reflected the privatisation programme – whereby the state divested itself of large public 
utilities in the energy and telecommunications sectors – as well as the somewhat slow 
growth of manufacturing in the second half of the 1990s.
8 
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years, FDI inflows were enough to finance the current account deficit.  
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Net FDI liabilities in 2007 reached USD 328.5 billion, one third of gross external liabilities. 
FDI inflows have mostly been in the form of equity stakes rather than intercompany loans, 
which constituted 12% of total net inflows from 2002 to 2007.  
The increase in the inflows of FDI has been accompanied by an increase in the outflows of 
income remittances linked to previous non-resident investments. Those outflows grew 
especially from 2005, when they almost doubled compared with previous years, reaching 
USD  11 billion. The upward trend has continued (Table 2). This behaviour reflected the 
cyclical upswing in Brazil as well as the appreciation of the Brazilian real (BRL).  
 
Table 2 
Direct investment income remittances 
In millions of US dollars 
 2005  2006  2007  2008
1  1995–98  1999–
2002  2003–07 
Income 
remittances  11,036 13,899 19,692 19,158  4,319  5,086  11,502 
Profits and 
dividends 9,783  12,373  17,898 18,045  3,772  3,980  10,148 
Interest on 
intercompany 
loans  1,253 1,526  1,794  1,113  547  1,106  1,354 
Profits and 
dividends received  733  1,073  2,202  1,059  890  955  1,201 
1  Up to August.  
 
Importantly, and in line with what happened in other large emerging economies, the outflow 
of Brazilian direct investment (BDI) has also increased in the past few years. To some extent, 
this too resulted from deregulation: until 2005, direct foreign investment by residents needed 
to be approved by the authorities. In this context, the annual average of BDI grew from 
USD 1 billion in 1999–2002 to USD 9.6 billion in 2003–07. Given that the stock of BDI is still 
relatively small, inflows of profits and dividends have also been limited, reaching an annual 
average of just USD 1.2 billion between 2003 and 2007.  
The UNCTAD World Investment Report (2008) stated that global FDI inflows increased 30% 
in 2007, reaching USD  1,833 billion. Latin America and the Caribbean received 
USD 126 billion of these resources, a rise of 36% over the 2006 figure. For South America, 
the increase was 66%, with USD 72 billion of inflows targeting the extractive industries and 
natural resource-based manufacturing (which is the industry that processes the raw material 
produced in the host country). Brazil was the top destination among Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, followed by Mexico (USD 24.7 billion ) and Chile (USD 19.3 billion ). As 
a share of GDP (2.6%), however, inflows to Brazil were less significant than those to Chile 





The size and magnitude of portfolio investment flows to Brazilian capital markets have 
changed substantially, especially in the past five years. Net inflows in the 1995–98 period 
were directed mainly to public securities, at an annual average of USD 11.2 billion, while 
investment in equities reached an annual flow of USD  4.3 billion.
10 Rising uncertainty 
following the exchange rate crisis in early 1999, as well as the domestic energy crisis in 2001 
and the election crisis in 2002, heavily impacted these flows, which were just USD 2.1 billion 
(net) in those years – gross inflows were significant in those years, but so were outflows.  
Beginning in 2005, with lower inflation and the start of a cyclical upswing, net inflows into the 
local equity market increased substantially, from USD 5.4 billion to USD 24.6 billion in 2007. 
Also from 2005 to 2007, gross inflows grew from USD 32.3 billion to USD 116.6 billion while 
the outflows rose from USD 26.9 billion to USD 92.0 billion. Be it in net or gross terms, these 
inflows are unprecedented in the post-World War II Brazilian experience.  
In fact, non-resident investors have taken on a key role in the increase in the number of initial 
public offerings in the local equity market, which rose from nine in 2004 to 59 in 2007. The capital 
market in Brazil has finally emerged as a source of financing for investment, partially replacing 
the domestic credit market and taking over some of the burden placed on the state-owned 
development bank (BNDES). Unlike the local buy-and-hold institutional investors, foreign 
investors, who owned some 12% of total market capitalisation as of December 2007, often are 
the marginal buyers and sellers of securities and as such play a pivotal role in price setting. 
In December 2006, the government exempted foreign investors from paying withholding tax 
on long-dated holdings of fixed income instruments. As a result, net inflows directed at 
purchasing fixed income securities rose from USD 0.7 billion in 2005 to USD 20.5 billion in 
2007 – the gross inflow in this market in 2007 being USD 61.3 billion and the gross outflow 
USD  40.8 billion. As of December 2007, foreigners held about 6% of total fixed income 
securities traded in the domestic market and accounted for 35% of market turnover.  
Net investment in long-term assets was USD 13.5 billion, but the amount invested in short-
term fixed income securities was also relevant, with gross inflows reaching USD 20.3 billion 
in 2007, while gross outflows were USD 13.8 billion (Table 3).  
Foreign investors have contributed in important ways to the development of Brazilian debt 
markets, particularly by providing demand for long-dated government bonds. In fact, the 
combination of macroeconomic stabilisation and the interest of foreigners in long-term public 
securities allowed the Treasury to lengthen the maturity of domestic public debt, which at the 
time of writing had an average tenor of nearly 38 months, compared with nine months a 
decade ago.  
Brazilian portfolio investment abroad grew substantially in the last few years, especially due 
to removal of some regulatory impediments, but also thanks to rising profitability of local 
corporate. Still, outflows are substantially smaller than inflows (Tables 3 and 4). 
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Table 3 
Portfolio investment flows to Brazilian markets 
In millions of US dollars 
 2005  2006  2007  2008
1  1995–98  1999–
2002  2003–07 
Equities
2 5,421  5,859  24,613  –256  1,799  –760  7,844 
Inflows  32,332  48,511 116,581  170,500 24,709  9,281  44,339 
Outflows 26,911  42,652  91,968  170,756  22,910 10,041 36,495 
Securities, long-term  413  6,971  13,548  13,610  –1,434  –487  4,226 
Inflows  2,450 17,776 40,987 26,124 1,263  1,202 12,610 
Outflows 2,037  10,805  27,439 12,514 2,697  1,689  8,384 
Securities, short-term  275  4,070  6,934  2,051  53  –32  2,290 
Inflows 1,633  10,400  20,337  5,430  111  328  6,719 
Outflows 1,358  6,330  13,403  3,379  58  360  4,429 
1  Up to August.    
2  Traded in domestic markets. 
 
In December 2007, the portfolio of foreign investors in the Brazilian capital market reached 
USD 214.11 billion: almost 77% in equities, 19% in fixed-yield government notes, 0.8% in 
derivatives, 0.05% in corporate notes and 2.7% in other financial instruments. 
 
Table 4 
Brazilian portfolio investment abroad 
In millions of US dollars 
 2005  2006  2007  2008
1  1995–98  1999–
2002  2003–07 
Equities   831  916  1,414  –75  213  1,082  708 
Outflows  901 1,322 1,976 1,244  267 1,790  936 
Inflows 70  406  562  1,319  54  708  228 
Securities, long-
term  519 –342  –1,789  –487 –136 –444 –283 
Outflows 3,607  4,372  3,084 1,470 1,319 1,286 3,146 
Inflows  3,088 4,714 4,873 1,957 1,455 1,730 3,429 
Securities, short- 
term 421  –579  90  –121  –1  0  –14 
Outflows 421  325  390  0  14  0  227 
Inflows 0  904  300  121  15  0  241 
1  Up to August. 
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The increase in portfolio investments, the appreciation of Brazilian asset prices (including the 
currency) and faster economic growth led to an increase in the remittances of dividends, from 
an annual average of USD  1.3  billion in 1999–2002 to USD  3.6 billion in 2003–07, while 




In millions of US dollars 
  2005 2006 2007 2008
1  1995–98  1999–
2002  2003–07 
Equities (dividends) 3,554  4,945 5,702 6,734 1,345 1,274 3,635 
Fixed income 
(interest) 14,461  14,877  15,342 10,503 12,362 15,667 14,619 




The nature of lending inflows changed substantially from the 1980s as banks embraced the 
originate-to-distribute business model. Thus, syndicated loans were replaced by the issuance 
of private commercial paper and notes, which became the main credit sources. However, 
direct loans, suppliers and trade credits are still important, especially for trade finance 
(Table 6). 
The nature of external credit to the government also changed. After the restructuring of the 
external debt, in the beginning of the 1990s, the government’s debt management strategy 
focused on building a yield curve that could be a benchmark for private sector issuance. This 
process was intensified after the prepayment of the debt held by the IMF and the Paris Club 
in 2004–05.
12  
Regarding the private sector, there was substantial deleveraging, especially until 2006. Despite 
the abundance of liquidity in international markets and the generally low level of global interest 
rates, the search for credit abroad was limited. Thus, in paying down their external debt, private 
sector debtors as well as the public sector benefited from international conditions, which led to 
small or negative net credit flows and reduced the Brazilian external debt. 
The strongest increase in credit inflows has been related to international trade, in line with 
the strong growth of exports and imports since the beginning of the new century. Large trade 
surpluses since 2003 resulted in an abundance of foreign currency in domestic exchange 
markets, contributing to the appreciation trend of the domestic currency.  
                                                  
11  For credit flows, we take the capital raised by bonds, notes and commercial paper issued abroad, plus long-
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investments.  
12  In 2006, to cover the buyback of external public bonds, the call of Brady bonds, tender offers and exchange 
offers, the government paid USD  17.5 billion. In 2007, buybacks  reached USD  1.3 billion. In 2005, 
prepayments of IMF debt  reached USD  20.8 billion. In October, a call of C-bonds (capitalisation bonds) 
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Table 6 
Private credit flows to Brazil 
In millions of US dollars 







Bonds (public and private)  2,208 –13,223  –7,880  –2,659  –79  2,441  –3,303 
Inflows 12,490  5,575  2,883  538  2,834  8,432  6,893 
Outflows 10,282  18,798  10,763 3,197  2,913 5,991  10,196 
Notes and commercial 
paper –3,126  3,450  5,633  1,596  12,613  –2,489  –183 
Inflows 7,337  10,244  15,434  5,640  16,855  6,979  8,566 
Outflows 10,463  6,794  9,801 4,044  4,242 9,468 8,749 
Short-term securities 
traded abroad  435 91  3,651  571  5  106  975 
Inflows 1,434  4,084  10,862  2,637  130  836  4,305 
Outflows 999  3,993  7,211  2,066  125  730  3,330 
Trade finance 
(suppliers) 3,585  12,789  17,210  6,752  483  –1,930  7,000 
Long-term –941  –841  134  548  86  –2,165  –799 
Disbursements  740  812 1,618 1,744  378 2,657 1,029 
Amortisation  1,681 1,653 1,484 1,196  292 4,822 1,828 
Short-term
2 4,526  13,630  17,076  6,204  397  235  7,799 
Loans, long-term
3 –2,291  10,505 64  10,188  –1,836  –911  –243 
Disbursements 7,976  27,250 16,076 15,299  –129 14,705 13,957 
Amortisation 10,267  16,745  16,012 5,111 1,707  15,616  14,200 
Loans, short-term
3, 4 –1,059 –516  13,768  2,099 –755  –1,854  1,913 
Total –248  13,096  32,446  18,547  10,431  –4,637  6,159 
1  Up to August.    
2  Disbursement net of amortizations.    
3  Includes international organisations, agencies, 
buyers’ credit and direct credit.    
4  Inflows net of amortisation payments. 
 
The combined data on investment and debt flows from 2001 to 2007 show that FDI is 
equivalent to about 33–40% of total net external liabilities, while the ratio of external debt to 
total liabilities decreased from 56% in 2001 to 35% in 2007, which clearly indicates the 
change of financing sources.  
In sum, capital flows to and from the Brazilian economy grew substantially in the past five 
years, and more intensely from 2006 on. But the trend was concentrated in portfolio 
investments, with less reliance on credit and more on investment funding.  
Abundant international liquidity during the recent period was an important determinant of the 
rise in flows and the shift towards investment funding, but one must look also at the domestic 
causes of those trends. BIS Papers No 44  111
 
 
2.  Explaining capital flows to Brazil 
Brazil’s achievement of macroeconomic stability and its success in strengthening its 
resilience to external shocks help explain the growth of the country’s attractiveness as a 
destination for foreign capital flows. 
Macroeconomic stability is a key precondition for sustainable growth. In that regard, the 
performance of monetary policy under the inflation targeting (IT) framework plays an 
important role. Brazil adopted IT in 1999 and has managed to keep inflation within its 
specified tolerance band during the past five years.
13 That success has allowed relative 
prices to function as effective signals for economic decisions, including for long-term 
planning. In this context, by using IT rather than a nominal exchange rate anchor, Brazil’s 
monetary policy has become increasingly more efficient in controlling inflation. That is, 
smaller increases in the policy rate have had stronger effects on expectations and pricing 
behaviour (see Graph 3 for the decrease in overnight interest rates and Graph 4 for the 
reduction in 12-month accumulated inflation).  
Graph 3  
Basic short-term interest rate target (Selic) 












                                                  
13  For recent developments, see A Bevilaqua, M Mesquita and A Minella (2008): “Brazil: taming inflation 
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Graph 4 
Evolution of inflation (Ample consumer price index) 










Note: the red lines are the inflation target (middle) 
and the limits of the tolerance band. In Brazil the IT 
is currently at 4.5% +/–2pp. 
Lower risk premia also reflect a fiscal policy committed to paring down net public 
indebtedness as a share of GDP. To that end, the government has been announcing and 
delivering primary fiscal surpluses since the end of the 1990s. Thus, net public sector debt 
peaked at 56% of GDP in 2002 and fell to 43% by December 2007 (Graph 5). Market 
projections suggest that it will fall to 35% by 2012. 
Graph 5  
Ratio of net public sector debt to GDP  













































































08BIS Papers No 44  113
 
 
These measures paved the way for a sustained acceleration of growth. Up to June 2008, the 
Brazilian economy had been growing at an average annual rate of 4.6% for 11 quarters 
(quarter over quarter, seasonally adjusted). The trend was supported essentially by external 
demand until 2005. Since then, domestic demand, reflecting strong increases in consumption 
and investment, has become the major driver of the economy. That changeover happened 
without any decrease in exports, which continued to grow at an annual rate of 18.5%.  
Although export growth has been stimulated by the rise in commodity prices, especially for 
grains and metals, about half of Brazilian exports are manufactured goods. That, in turn, 
should mitigate the impact of swings in commodity prices on the value of total exports. 
Moreover, the destinations of Brazil’s exports are fairly diverse: Latin America buys 22.7% of 
the country’s exports, while Asia buys 15.7%, the United States 15.8% and the European 
Union 25.2%. However, despite the strong growth in international trade in the past few years, 
Brazil is still a very closed economy, as imports and exports are equivalent to just 21.4% of 
GDP. This feature of the economy has long been seen as an impediment to faster economic 
growth, but it should mitigate the impact of a global slowdown on aggregate demand.  
Robust growth of domestic demand has been supported by rising income levels and fast 
credit expansion. Unemployment rates have been on a downward trend and reached 7.6% 
(seasonally adjusted) in August 2008, the lowest level since 2002; average real income 
growth in the past 12 months has been 6%. Moreover, since 2005, credit to households has 
been growing at an average annual rate of 31.3%, while bank lending to enterprises has 
been expanding at a rate of 28.4%. 
One aspect that should be stressed is the resilience of the Brazilian financial sector since the 
restructuring of the system in the second half of the 1990s. Macroeconomic stabilisation, and 
consequently the end of high inflation, induced a rapid overhaul of the system. The banks 
that were unable to adjust, especially three large private sector banks, became the core of 
PROER (the Programme of Incentives for Restructuring and Strengthening the Financial 
System). Moreover, two federal banks and two federal development banks were placed 
under enhanced supervision by the central bank, which showed the need for larger 
provisions and adjustments for capital adequacy. Finally, banks owned by the states were 
streamlined through PROES (the Programme of Incentives for the Reduction of the Role of 
the State in Banking), restructured and privatised.
14  
The growth of the domestic market, combined with the increased predictability of policies and 
of the domestic economy, has made Brazil more attractive for international investors and 
favoured the increase in foreign capital flows. But the upswing in commodity prices has also 
played an important role: 38.7% of gross FDI inflows in 2007–08 have been in commodity or 
commodity-related sectors.  
Moreover, the government has actively pursued policies aimed at reducing the economy’s 
vulnerability to shocks. The Treasury, which is responsible for managing the federal public 
debt, has been implementing a programme to withdraw exchange rate linked securities, 
increase the share of fixed rate instruments and lengthen the tenor of the public debt 
(Graph  6). As of the beginning of 2000, public debt indexed to exchange rate variation 
increased substantially, reaching 38% of total public sector domestic debt in October 2001.
15 
                                                  
14  A longer explanation is available in I Goldfajn, K Hennings and H Mori, “Financial system in Brazil: resilience 
to shocks, preserving real value, and struggling to promote growth”, Central Bank of Brazil Working Paper 
Series, no 75, June 2003; and in G Maia, “Restructuring the banking system – the case of Brazil”, BIS Policy 
Papers, no 6, Basel, August 1999, pp 106–23.  
15  The impact of the public securities linked to exchange rate variation on the net public sector debt to GDP ratio 
is explained in I Goldfajn, “Are there reasons to doubt fiscal sustainability in Brazil”, BIS Papers, no 20, Basel, 
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Since 2003, the government has bought back all these securities, totalling USD 81.3 billion. 
In 2002, in the context of the confidence crisis, the central bank sold foreign exchange 
swaps, in which the monetary authority was long domestic currency and short US dollars. 
The appreciation path of the domestic currency after the overshooting in 2002 favoured the 
exchange of the swap contracts for reverse swap contracts, in which the central bank was 
long US dollars. As a result, a depreciation of the real, say in a global stress scenario, would 
lead to an improvement in public finances rather than a deterioration (Graph 7).
16  
Graph 6  
Composition of federal public debt securities 













Effects on federal public debt of a  
1% change in the exchange rate 
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Another important improvement was the extension of the domestic public debt yield curve 
through the issuance of longer-dated securities and the creation of markets for those assets. 
The lengthening of the maturity of the debt implies lower rollover risk, hence lower overall 
macroeconomic risk. At the end of 2002, the average tenor of domestic public debt was 
21.8 months. By December 2007, it was 33.1 months (Graph 8). 
Graph 8 
Maturity structure of federal public securities debt 














In addition to domestic debt restructuring, the government and the central bank adopted a 
policy to increase the resilience of the economy to external shocks. This policy included 
prepaying of the IMF and Paris Club debt, buying back external public securities issued in 
the context of the early 1990s rescheduling of debt, increasing international reserves via the 
purchase of foreign currency in the domestic market, and acquiring foreign currency for debt 
service purposes in domestic markets instead of using international reserves.  
The policy for accumulating foreign exchange reserves was announced in January 2004. 
Under the policy, through fully sterilised intervention, the central bank bought 
USD  139.7  billion in the domestic market over the next four years; at the end of 2007, 
international reserves were USD 180.3 billion. The policy did not impinge on exchange rate 
flexibility: at the inception of the policy, the exchange rate was BRL 2.93 to the dollar, and it 
fell, not monotonically, to BRL 1.78 to the dollar by the end of 2007. US dollar purchase 
auctions have been undertaken at current market prices so as not to influence the exchange 
rate path. The central bank has also managed the process so as not to add to market 
volatility. 
These measures influenced the behaviour of capital flows: amortisation outflows increased in 
2004 and 2005, and the build-up of foreign exchange reserves contributed materially to 
Brazil’s achievement of investment grade status. Gross external debt fell from more than 
30% of GDP in 2004 to 14% in 2007 (Graph 10). With the decline of external debt and the 
increase in international reserves, the ratio of net external debt to GDP moved from 20.4% in 
2004 to –0.9% at the end of 2007. The ratio of international reserves to short-term debt, 
considering payments due within 12 months, grew from 99% in 2004 to 290% in 2007 
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Graph 9  












Net external debt and S&P ratings 












The capital and financial accounts of Brazil’s balance of payments have changed in 
important ways in the past few years. FDI, private equity and equity portfolio inflows have 
increased in relative importance, whereas debt has declined – FDI, as shown in Table 7, has 
historically been more resilient in crisis periods than other sources of funding. The country as 
a whole has deleveraged through a process led by the public sector. Outflows have also 
increased, especially of FDI, as large Brazilian corporations developed their overseas 
operations, mostly through mergers and acquisitions. 
Overall, these developments should make the economy more resilient to external shocks. 
primarily because its external funding needs are smaller – 2.8% of GDP at end-2007, 
compared with 10.6% at the end of 2001. Moreover, within the set of net external liabilities, 
the dominance of equity capital (both FDI and portfolio) means that profit and dividend 
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Profit remittances are much more sensitive to the state of the domestic business cycle and to 
exchange rate movements than are interest payments. These outflows increased from an 
annual average of USD 3.8 billion in 1995–2002 to USD 10.1 billion in 2003–07 and reached 
USD  17.9  billion in 2007. This behaviour can be attributed to the high level of corporate 
profits in Brazil – thanks to the economic upswing – combined with appreciation of the 
Brazilian real. It is reasonable to expect, on the other hand, that in periods of economic 
difficulty, domestic currency weakness or both, profit remittances will tend to be smaller. It 
pays, in this sense, to tap foreign savings in the form of equity rather than debt. 
Table 7 
Capital flows in periods of stress  
Monthly averages, in millions of US dollars 
Crisis Time  period  FDI  Portfolio  Credit 
Mexican Jan–Jun  1995  258.32 –392.49  1,541.12 
Asian   Jan–Jun 1997  1,297.96  1,027.24  225.15 
 Jul–Dec  1997  1,867.53  –150.95  236.57 
Russian   Feb–Jul 1998  2,038.83  1,456.71  3,722.58 
 Aug  1998– 
Jan 1999  3,134.33  –2,281.84  438.33 
Brazilian Jan–Jun  1999  2,215.00  130.00  –1,843.00 
9/11 Mar–Aug  2001  1,856.92  235.67  1,296.55 
 Sep  2001– 
Jan 2002  1,832.61 58.47  508.47 
Confidence   Apr–Oct 2002  1,316.42  –89.11  1,158.50 
Subprime   Jan–Jun 2007 3,475.38  3,349.30  5,921.78 
 Jul–Dec  2007  2,288.77  4,433.88  –434.04 
 
The Brazilian economy has faced at least five international and domestic shocks in the past 
decade: the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis, the devaluation of the real, 9/11, the Argentine 
crisis, the pre-electoral crisis in confidence, and now the subprime crisis. All of them led to an 
increase in the risk aversion of international investors and the sell-off of public bonds in 
international markets, which in turn led to sudden stops in capital flows. Those stops were 
magnified within Brazil by the foreign exchange exposure of the public sector. 
In the past few years, the authorities have managed, chiefly through the accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves, to take advantage of the favourable external environment to 
address the issue of foreign exchange exposure. Nowadays, in contrast to the 1990s, the 
public sector is a structural net creditor in foreign exchange. This means that a turn to 
unfavourable conditions – say, a worldwide increase in risk aversion, which may lead to 
depreciation of the Brazilian real – would result in a falling ratio of net public debt to GDP. 
Thus, the public sector can act as a shock absorber rather than a multiplier. In fact, as seen 
in Table 8, the economy has indeed become more resilient in the past few years and was 
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Max  Six months 
after  Max  Six months 
after 
Mexico Jan–Apr  1995  8.2  7.1  3,557 3,557 –46.8 –26.5  –6.91  –5.29  832  249 
Asia Jul–Dec  1997  3.6  3.6  1,994 2,549 –35.7 –21.0  –5.58  –5.44  377    130 
Russia  Aug 1998–Dec 1999
1 3.8  3.8  2,308 933  –55.6  –34.5 –29.02 –25.65 1,042  923 
Brazil Jan–Jun  1999  77.1  46.9  803 –800  –26.9  60.0 –10,708  –3,210  549  –240 
9/11  Sep 2001–Feb 2002  12.0  –4.41  10  –21  –23  1.2  –0.433  –0.393  301  –116 
Confidence Apr–Oct  2002
2 68.6  63.5  221  221  –39.3  –32.5 –3.83  –0.866  1,731 1,742 
Subprime Jul–Dec  2007  5.0  –7.6 75  75  –10.9  16.7 33,233  33,233  97  56 
1  Window of five months because the exchange rate regime in Brazil was changed from a managed exchange rate to a floating regime.    
2  Window of seven months 
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Brazil is a commodity-producing and -exporting economy (although exports of manufactured 
goods are sizeable). Commodity-related capital flows are also large; historically, they have 
been correlated positively with the terms of trade and thus have magnified the impact of 
commodity price shifts on the balance of payments. Under these circumstances, there are 
clear benefits from having an adequate stock of foreign assets, in the form of central bank 
reserves or in alternative vehicles, so as to buffer the effects of commodity price swings on 
the economy. Thus, accumulating foreign reserves – while preserving foreign exchange 
flexibility – is prudent not only from a fiscal viewpoint but also in a wider macroeconomic 
sense. 